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ABSTRACT   
This study aims to analyze the factors that influence earnings management with 
profitability as a moderating variable. The factors analyzed were information 
asymmetry, leverage, firm size, institutional ownership , and managerial 
ownership. This type of research is causal associative. The study population was 
50 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-
2015. The sampling method is a census, so the number of samples used is 200 
observation data . Hypothesis testing is done using multiple linear regression 
analysis and residual test. The results showed partially information asymmetry, 
institutional ownership and managerial ownership had a positive and significant 
effect on earnings management, while the leverage and size of the company had a 
positive and not significant effect on earnings management. Simultaneously 
information asymmetry, leverage, firm size, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership have a significant effect on earnings management. 
Profitability as a moderating variable cannot moderate the relationship between 
information asymmetry, leverage , firm size, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership with earnings management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial report is the final result of the accounting process and is a 
reflection of the condition of a company. The financial statements are also a 
means of communicating financial information to parties outside the company. 
The financial statements are expected to provide information to investors and 
creditors in making decisions relating to the investment of their funds. The 
information presented by the company in the financial statements is the basis for 
the consideration of stakeholders in making business decisions. This is in line 
with what is stated in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB ) 
conceptual framework that the purpose of financial statements is to provide useful 
information for business decisions. 
Profit is one of the important components in the financial statements that are used 
to measure the improvement or performance of a company. In the preparation of 
financial statements, the accrual basis is chosen because it generally provides a 
better indication of the economic performance of the company than the 
information generated from the latest cash receipts and expenditures (FASB). 
However accrual accounting also has weaknesses. The use of accrual basis can 
provide flexibility to management in choosing accounting methods as long as they 
do not deviate from the applicable rules of Financial Accounting Standards. The 
choice of accounting methods deliberately chosen by management for certain 
purposes is known as earnings management (Rahmawati et al., 2006). Earnings 
management according to Scott (2009: 403) is "the manager by accounting 
manager's accounting strategy some specific objectives", which means that 
earnings management is the manager's decision to choose certain accounting 
policies that are considered to be able to achieve the desired goals, whether to 
increase profits or reduce reported losses. According to Nuryaman (2008) 
earnings management is a condition in which management intervenes in the 
process of preparing financial statements for external parties so that it can evenly, 
increase and decrease earnings reporting. Aside from being one of the factors that 
can reduce the credibility of financial statements, earnings management also adds 
to the bias of financial statements so that it disrupts users in believing the figures 
of the engineering results. 
Earnings management as a phenomenon is influenced by various factors. Agency 
issues are related to factors that encourage earnings management. According to 
the agency theory the separation between owners and managers can cause 
problems agency (agency problems). This problem is the misalignment of 
interests between the shareholders ( principal ) and the manager or agent ( agent ). 
As an agent, managers are morally responsible for optimizing the profits of the 
owners ( principals ), but on the other hand managers also have an interest in 
maximizing their welfare. So that most likely the agent does not always act in the 
interests of the principal. From the description of the phenomenon and differences 
in the results of the research, the researcher is interested in conducting research on 
earnings management with information asymmetry variables, leverage, firm size, 
institutional ownership and managerial ownership as factors that influence it. 
Researchers also added profitability as a moderating variable because they wanted 
to examine the extent to which the level of profitability of a company could 
influence in terms of strengthening or weakening earnings management practices. 
The companies used as samples in this study are manufacturing companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
2. STUDY OF LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Agency Theory  
Agency theory describes the company as a meeting point between the 
company owner (principal) and management (agent). Principal delegates 
responsibility for decision making to aagent, it can also be said that the principal 
gives a mandate to the agent to carry out certain tasks in accordance with the 
agreed work contract. The authority and responsibility of the agent and principal 
are regulated in a work contract with mutual agreement (Muliati, 2011 ) Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) state that the agency relationship is a contract between 
manager (agent) and investor (principal). The occurrence of a conflict of interest 
between the owner and agent because of the possibility of the agent acting not in 
accordance with the interests of the principal, thus triggering the agency cost. 
2.2. Profit management 
Earnings management is a phenomenon by which managers can choose a 
particular accounting policy with a view to maximize their welfare or increase the 
value of the company (Scott, 2009). Setiawatidan Na'im, (2000) states that 
earnings management is an intervention in the process of Sulistyanto (2008) 
explaining earnings management is the effort of company managers to intervene 
or influence information in financial statements with the aim of deceiving 
stakeholders who want to know the performance and conditions of the company . 
Earnings management is a condition in which management intervenes in the 
process of preparing financial statements for external parties so that it can flatten, 
increase and decrease the reporting of earnings (Nuryaman, 2008) external 
financial reporting with the aim to benefit themselves. 
2.3. Asimetri Informatiodan Teori Bid-Ask Spread 
Information asymmetry is a situation that arises when one party does not 
have knowledge about the other party involved in the transaction so that it is 
impossible to make an accurate decision when conducting a transaction where one 
of the parties involved has superiority and excess information compared to the 
other party (Scott, 2009) . Information asymmetry is a condition where managers 
have access to information on the company's prospects that are not owned by 
parties outside the company (Putra et al., 2014). According to Rahmawati et al . 
(2006) information asymmetry is a condition where a party has information that is 
not known by others. This condition provides an opportunity for management to 
use the information they know to manipulate financial statements in accordance 
with their interests. Bid ask spread theory is used to measure information 
asymmetry, where the information asymmetry of a company is reflected on the 
spread . Use a bid ask spread as a proxy of information asymmetry according to 
Komalasari (2001) because in the capital market mechanism, capital market 
players also face agency problems. 
2.4. Leverage 
Leverage is a ratio that measures the size of a company's assets financed by 
debt. The leverage ratio can be known by comparing total debt with total assets. 
According to Arrita in Azlina (2010) leverage is the company's ability to use 
assets or funds that have a fixed load (debt) effectively so that they can obtain an 
optimal level of operating income. 
2.5. Company Size 
Company size is a scale that classifies the size and size of a company in 
various ways, including: total assets , log size , stock market value (Azlina, 2010). 
Moses in Suwito and Herawati, (2005) explains that basically the size of the 
company is only divided into 3 categories: large companies, medium firms, small 
companies. 
2.6. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is part of the company's shares owned by 
institutions, such as insurance companies, financial institutions (banks, financial 
companies, credit), pension funds, investment banking and other companies 
related to these categories (Yang et al ., 2009). Chew and Gillan in Agustia (2013) 
explain that there are two types of institutional investors, namely institutional 
investors as transient investors and institutional investors as sophisticated 
investors. 
 
2.7. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is the amount of share ownership owned by the 
manager. Jensen and Meckling in Agustia (2013) found that managerial 
ownership managed to be one of the determining factors to reduce agency 
problems from managers by aligning manager's interests with shareholders. 
2.8. Profitability 
Profitability is the company's ability to make a profit from the assets used 
According to Gunawan et al . (2015) profitability is the level of net profit that is 
successfully obtained by the company in carrying out its operations. In relation to 
earnings management, profitability can affect managers to make earnings 
management. Because if the company's profitability is low, managers will 
generally take earnings management actions to save their performance in front of 
the owner. This is closely related to the manager's effort to show the best 
performance of the company he leads. 
 
2.9. Conceptual Framework  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
  
The hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
1. Information asymmetry, leverage, firm size and institutional ownership have 
a positive effect, while managerial ownership has a negative and partial effect 
on profit management 
2. Profitability can moderate the relationship between information asymmetry, 
leverage, firm size, institutional ownership and managerial ownership with 
earnings management. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research was conducted on manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2012 to 2015. Data were obtained from the 
information on the official website of Indonesia Stock Exchange website address 
www.idx.co.id . Research time is carried out in stages starting from October 2016 
to July 2017 . The population used in research this is company listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with information : the company has been listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange before 2012 and has not been delisted during 
2012-2015, m published a complete financial statement in Rupiah and has been 
audited during 2012-2015 and has data on stock prices and managerial ownership. 
Taking sample in research this do with use census method where all population 
numbers are sampled. So the number of samples in this study were as many as 50 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2015. 
Therefore, the total sample in this study for 4 years of observation was 50 samples 
multiplied by 4 years to 200 observation data . 
 
 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULT 
 
Statistical Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
Classic Assumption Test 
Normality Test Results 
Graph of Normal Probability of Residual Plots 
  
 
Probability value or Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) is 0.091. Because the probability value, 
which is 0.091 is greater than the significance level, which is 0.05, then the 
assumption of normality is fulfilled. 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
 
Based on the table above, it is known that all VIF values are <10, so 
multicollinearity is not indicated. 
 
Heterocedasticity test 
The statistical test that can be used to test the assumption of homoskedasticity is 
the Koenker – Bassett (KB) test. The Koenker Bassett test is the same as the 
Pagan Breusch test, but this test is made strong for outlier or abnormal data. If this 
test is statistically significant, this indicates that the relationship between several 
or all independent variables and the dependent variable is not stationary. One of 
the independent variables may be a strong predictor in some areas but is weak in 
other regions. 
 
 
Based on The table above, it is known that the Sig value of the predictive 
quadratic variable is 0.419> 0.05, so it is concluded that heteroscedasticity does 
not occur 
 
From the picture above it can be seen that the points spread randomly above and 
below the number o) on the Y axis, and do not form a specific or irregular pattern. 
This means heteroscedasticity in the regression model, so this model is suitable 
for use. 
 
Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation testing results 
 
The statistical value of the Durbin-Watson test smaller than 1 or greater than 3 
indicates autocorrelation. Based on Table 5.7 , the value of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 2,261 . Note that because the Durbin-Watson statistic value is between 
1 and 3, that is 1 <2,261 <3, then the non-assumption autocorrelation is met . In 
other words, there are no symptoms of high autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Autocorrelation tests can also be done using the Runs test. The following results 
are presented based on the Runs test 
 
 Based on the results of the Runs test, the probability value or Asymp is 
known . Sig. (2-tailed) is 0.247> 0.05, so autocorrelation does not occur. 
 
Hypothesis I Test 
The multiple regression model between the independent variable (X) against the 
dependent variable (Y) can be formulated in the form of the following equation: 
Y = α + β 1 X 1 + β 2 X 2 + β 3 X 3 + β 4 X 4 + β 5 X 5 + ε 
 
 The value of the regression coefficient of information asymmetry is 0.057, 
which is positive. This value can be interpreted as information asymmetry has a 
positive effect on earnings management. The value of Sig 0.036 <0.05 and the 
value of t count 2.117 is in the area  Therefore, information asymmetry has a 
significant effect on earnings management. The value of the regression coefficient 
of leverage is 0.038, which is positive. This value can be interpreted as leverage 
influences positively on earnings management. M aka leverage change (X 2 ) of 1 
percent will increase earnings management (Y) by 0.038 percent. The value of Sig 
0.723> 0.05 and the value of t count 0.355 is in the area  , then leverage has no 
significant effect on earnings management. Regression coefficient value of the 
company size is 0.022, which is positive, then changes in company size (X 3 ) by 
1 percent will increase earnings management (Y) by 0.022 percent. The value of 
Sig 0,961> 0,05 and the value of t count 0,050 is in the area  , the size of the 
company has no significant effect on earnings management. The regression 
coefficient value of institutional ownership is 0.524, which is positive . It also 
means that if the regression coefficients of other variables remain (unchanged), 
then changes in institutional ownership (X 4 ) by 1 percent will increase earnings 
management (Y) by 0.524 percent. It is known that the value of Sig 0.031 <0.05 
and the value of t count 2.168 is in the region  , institutional ownership has a 
significant effect on earnings management. The regression coefficient value of 
managerial ownership is 0.029, which is a positive value . It also means that if the 
regression coefficients of other variables remain (unchanged), then changes in 
institutional ownership (X 5 ) by 1 percent will increase Management of Profit (Y) 
by 0.029 percent. The value of Sig 0,019 <0,05 and the value of t count 2,375 is in 
the region  , managerial ownership has a significant effect on earnings 
management. 
 
Significance of Simultaneous Effect Test (Test F) 
 
 F count is 4.437 > F table value of 2.262. A probability value (Sig.) 0.001 
<0.05 m aka asymmetry of information, leverage, firm size, institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership and simultaneously significant effect on 
earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis II Test 
 
  Coefficient value regression from management profit is -0.189 ( worth 
negative ), however not significant ( Sig. 0.130> 0 , 05 ). this means profitability 
not significant in moderate relationship between asymmetry information to value 
management profit  
 
 Coefficient value regression from management profit is -0.210 ( worth 
negative ), however not significant ( Sig. 0.101> 0 , 05 ). this means profitability 
not significant in moderate relationship between leverage to value management 
profit . 
 
 Coefficient value regression from management profit is -0.203 ( worth 
negative ), however not significant ( Sig. 0.108> 0 , 05 ). this means profitability 
not significant in moderate relationship between size company to value 
management profit. 
 
 Coefficient value regression from management profit is -0.220 ( worth 
negative ), however not significant ( Sig. 0.083> 0 , 05 ). this means profitability 
not significant in moderate relationship between ownership institutional to value 
management profit 
 
 Coefficient value regression from earnings management -0.215 ( worth 
negative ), however not significant ( Sig. 0.094> 0 , 05 ). this means profitability 
not significant in moderate relationship between ownership managerial to value 
management profit . 
 
Determination Coefficient Analysis 
  
 The value of the coefficient of determination ( Adjusted R-Square ) is 0. 
083 . This value can be interpreted as information asymmetry, leverage , firm 
size, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership , together can explain or 
explain variations ( earnings ) of earnings management by 8.3 %, the remaining 
91.7 % is explained by variables or other factors. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
5.1. Conclusion 
Simultaneously, information asymmetry, leverage, firm size, institutional 
ownership and managerial ownership have a significant effect on earnings 
management. Partially, information asymmetry, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership have a significant positive effect on earnings management, 
while leverage and firm size have no significant positive effect on earnings 
management. Profitability cannot moderate the relationship between information 
asymmetry, leverage, firm size, institutional ownership and managerial ownership 
with earnings management. 
5.2. Limitations 
Influence variables independent on research this have value Adjusted R 
Square small and only consists of from 5 ( five ) variable independent that is 
information asymmetry, leverage , firm size, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership. Value Adjusted R Square is small this indicate that still 
many variables independent others who can influence earnings management . The 
sample used in this study is limited to manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange which publish their annual financial statements stated 
in rupiahs and not delisted during 2012-2015 with a sample of 50 companies. 
Limitations in the sample of the companies under study led to the research 
objective being unable to be reflected in its entirety in manufacturing companies 
listed on the IDX and could not be generalized to other types of companies such 
as banking, telecommunications or transportation. This study only uses proxy 
Debt Assets Ratio (DAR) to measure leverage, proxy Ln total assets to measure 
the size of the company and proxy Return on Assets (ROA) to measure the 
profitability while there is still a proxy else that could be used to measure these 
variables. 
5.3. Suggestion 
Based on value Adjusted R Square is small on research this only consists of 
from 5 (five) variable independent then very recommended for research then to 
get it add / change with variables other independent , such as audit committees, 
independent board of commissioners, audit quality, percentage of public shares 
and company age . Based on limitations the sample used on research this , then 
very recommended for research then to get it do research other than of the 
company listed on the Stock Exchange and add period year research . Research 
too could do on object and location other studies that don't limited on companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange. Further researchers can use different proxies to 
measure leverage such as Debt Equity Ratio (DER) proxy, total sales proxy or 
stock market value to measure company size and proxy Return on Equity (ROE) 
or Return on Investment (ROI) to measure profitability to find out differences in 
results obtained using different proxies. For companies: Based on an analysis of 
factors that influence earnings management, the company ( principal) can 
improve supervision or control of its management performance by implementing 
an effective Internal Control System so that management performs its work in 
accordance with established standards in order to reduce earnings management 
actions. For investors: Investors in the capital market should be more careful and 
conduct market analysis of the company before making a decision to invest using 
the services of an accountant or financial consultant to obtain information.  
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